Monday, May 9, 2011

Sarah Palin, Sean Parnell: How to make Alaskans less safe

Mr. Governor, Mr. Lt. Governor, Mr. Commissioner/TAG:

“We're not allowed to use the term militiaman or militia any longer.
They tell us it sounds like a security term and we no longer are involved in any way in security!”

How does the above quote reconcile with National Guard Bureau Regulation 10-4?

NGR 10-4
National Guard Bureau Regulation 10-4 covers the relationship of the National Guard to the State Defense Forces under 32 USC § 109(c).

The section Recommendations for Improvement in my Blue Print for the ASDF was drafted using the following sections of NGR 10-4 as a guide.

NGR 10-4
“4. Status
a. Command and control: State Defense Forces, as contemplated by these regulations, the foregoing statutory authority, The Constitution of the United States, the constitution and laws of the State concerned, is solely a State organization under the exclusive jurisdiction of the respective governor. It is not subject to call, order, or draft, as such a force, into the Armed Forces of the United States. It is not subject to Federal regulation, control, or supervision other than as provided expressly, or by reasonable implication, by the statute cited in para 3. Such a force may not be controlled or commanded by Federal authorities, and missions are identified and assigned only by appropriate State officials. The State Adjutant General, even though he/she may be a federally recognized officer, is not considered as Federal Authority.
b. Appointment and commissioning of officers: Persons appointed as an officer in a State Defense Force, including general officers, are commissioned solely by the State, and as such, are not federally recognized or guaranteed the rights and privileges of a commissioned officer in the U.S. Armed Forces, or the Reserve Components thereof. Specific rank and title are assigned by the State.

5. Mission
a. The mission of a State Defense Force, as conceived by these regulations, is to provide an adequately trained and organized State military reserve force which would be under the exclusive control of the governor. It would be capable of accomplishing those State emergency responsibilities normally assigned to the National Guard, when that force is federalized or otherwise not available to the needs of the governor. In addition, they would be available to perform any such missions as the governor directs, within Federal and State laws concerned.
b. Assignment of missions: Actual operating missions will be assigned only by authorized State officials (usually the State Adjutant General). However, the requirement for coordination of local and State internal security operations, with that of the U.S. Armed Forces, is obvious in the accomplishment of cooperative missions. SDF personnel and units will not be commanded by nor their operations and activities controlled directly by, Federal civilian or military authorities. Any direct coordination will be conducted between the senior Federal military commander present and the appointed emissary of the governor.
c. Potential missions:
(1) Assist civil authorities in the preservation of order, and protection of life and property.
(2) Meet such domestic emergencies as may arise within the State.
(3) Guard and protect critical industrial installations and facilities, as determined by the governor, when other means are deemed inadequate.
(4) Prevent or suppress subversive activities, in conjunction with, or in support of State or local law enforcement agencies.
(5) Under control of the governor, cooperate with Federal military authorities and forces engaged in active military operations or charged with internal security missions within the State.
(6) Assume control of State armories and property, provide security for any Federal property until relieved by proper authority, and assist in the mobilization of the National Guard when so directed by the governor.
(7)Perform other duties as may be assigned by the governor, under the constitution and laws of the state.
c. Conflict of missions: To the end that interests of the United States and the various States be preserved, the highest degree of cooperation should be maintained between Federal and State officials concerned. If a situation of conflict Or potential conflict of interest develops, it should be resolved between the Adjutant General and the senior Federal military commander present. Consideration should be given to the paramount Federal concern with the overall problem of national defense.

6. Organization
a. Planning and conducting military operations against hostile military forces are the responsibility of the Armed Forces of the United States. Operations and activities of State Defense Forces, as envisioned by this regulation, are supplemental to the State mission of the National Guard during peacetime and are considered to be of a constabulary nature and not that of combat forces. Organization under Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO/E) similar to military police or light infantry would most closely facilitate these anticipated missions.
b. The primary objective of DoD regarding State Defense Forces would be for a cadre-size unit to be established within each State during peacetime. This cadre would represent approximately 10 to 15% of their perceived mobilization strength, provide a command and control element, representation at each National Guard armory within the State, and allow for rapid expansion if the situation arises. Priority for any future Federal support that may be authorized will be given to those states whose Defense Force organization is considered most appropriate (by the Service Secretary) to accomplish the general missions outlined above.”

I have pointed out before that there appears to be a penalty for those States whose State Defense Forces fail to train for the missions envisioned under paragraph 5.

The question that I have yet to have answered fully, is what happens when the ARNG is off doing federal missions?

Which State agency takes the place of the ASDF under AS 26.05.100?

It certainly appears that the State Military Police Constabulary mission should be a current and ongoing mission for the ASDF, given paragraphs 4-6 of NGR 10-4, especially given that Military Police units that are now a part of the ARNG. After all, NGR 10-4 para. 4-6 envision the SDFs to be trained in the duties and missions of the ARNG, and under AS 26.05.100 the ASDF is to augment and act as a force multiplier to the ARNG. Contrary to the policy of your administration regarding the missions of the ASDF, NGR 10-4 envisions the ASDF maintaining an armed, internal security role.

Since when is it a policy of the Governor of the State of Alaska to act to reduce, or otherwise render ineffective a State military unit?

I have presented my arguments in the recent past, supported by the authorities and regulations directly impacting the situation.

All of which speak to an armed State militia with an internal security mission as found under AS 26.05.070.

Who ever heard of an unarmed militia?

It is my personal belief that this administration is ignoring the intent and purpose of Art. 1 Sec. 19 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska and the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Not only has this administration diminished the organized militia, it has done so without any public input, and has further acted to disarm a unit of the organized militia.

Worse, this travesty has been accomplished without any oversight by the Legislature.

Alaska is not safer, Mr. Governor.

Is the War over?

Has Alaska gone geologically “inactive”?

Is the recession over?

Are Alaska’s energy needs fulfilled so that we in south central no longer have to worry about power failure or rolling brown outs, should there be a compressor failure in the
Kenai gas fields?

Is the Trans Alaska Pipeline System restored to 1980 condition and flow rates, so that the potential for shutdown is reduced to a distant consideration?

Is the Army National Guard of the State of Alaska no longer subject to federal service?

Mr. Governor, you have ignored the realities of 2006 and the fact that ARNG units just returned from the Middle East.

I am asking for a meeting at the Governor’s level, given the failure at the Commissioner level, if you and your second can take 20 minutes of your precious time to discuss what you have done to Alaska and Alaskans by the diminishment and disarming of the Alaska State Defense Force.

You sir, are the second Alaska Republican Governor who has reduced the armed forces of this State in a time of WAR!

With the silence, and thereby assent, of the Legislature, your Administration has made Alaskans less safe and reduced the State’s ability to respond to a major emergency.

Larry Wood