Showing posts with label ANGDA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ANGDA. Show all posts

Thursday, November 21, 2013

CANCELLED!: Meet Bill Walker and Craig Fleener, Wasilla this Friday 4pm to 7pm at Re/Max in Wasilla!

CANCELLED DUE TO ROAD CONDITIONS!



Please join us, 4pm -7pm, Wasilla Re/MAX building to meet Bill Walker and Chris Fleener, candidates for Governor and Lt. Governor.

Saturday, April 13, 2013

HB4 is a bad idea and a slap in the voters' faces

HB4 creating the Alaska Gas Development Corporation was passed by the Alaska House on 2 April, 2013 by a vote of 30-9. This bill is the culmination of over 10 years of effort on the part of the Legislature and the Governor to end the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority created by 138,000 votes for Proposition 3 in 2002. HB4 is now before the Alaska Senate, where it will probably pass, given the list of sponsors in the Senate: Senators Dyson, Huggins, Giessel, McGuire, and Micciche. There are only 20 members of the Alaska Senate. Senator Charlie Huggins is the Senate President. Therefore, the likelihood of this legislation failing to pass is nil.

Alaska’s history of attempting to get a natural gas pipeline built to move natural gas from the North Slope to market has been convoluted. HB4 further complicates this confusing and contradictory history.

Prop 3 passed in 2002 mandated the State to create a natural gas development authority (AS 41.41) to build the all-Alaska natural gas pipeline from Prudhoe to Valdez, with a 250 mmcf spur to south central. The capacity of the all-Alaska natural gas pipeline (AANGPV) to be built was approximately 2.5-3.0 bcf/da with most of the gas converted to LNG and then shipped to market in the U.S. or to foreign markets. Proposition 3 created the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority (ANGDA), which was to be have been the vehicle that would oversea the natural gas development potential for Alaska. From the very start, ANGDA was vehemently opposed, disrespected, and diminished by Governor Frank Murkowski, Governor Sarah Palin, Governor Sean Parnell and the Legislature from 2002 forward. With their opposition to ANGDA, the aforementioned belied any intention of respecting the peoples’ will where building a natural gas pipeline was concerned. This disrespect has been amplified in the creation of the Alaska Gas Development Corporation (AGDC) and the Alaska Stand Alone Pipeline (ASAP).

Governor Frank Murkowski rejected the will of the voters with his churlish opposition to ANGDA and the all-Alaska natural gas pipeline (AANGPV). Murkowski funded ANGDA with an initial appropriation of $50,000 and the Legislature gave more money later in 2003. ANGDA’s yearly budgets then and since barely covered the cost of the few positions created. Compare this situation with the $400 million that will be shoveled into the AGDC’s Alaska Stand Alone Pipeline (ASAP) by the Legislature under HB4 and the $214 million previously appropriated for the various iterations of the ASAP line. Today, ANGDA’s website lists four on the ANGDA Board and one employee as Executive Director. Harold Heinze, a former CEO of ARCO, was the previous Chief Executive Director until he stepped down on December 8, 2011.

ANGDA accomplished much during its colored history. ANGDA explored moving gas south by truck to Fairbanks, permitting of the 250 mmcf spur line from Glennallen to Palmer’s Enstar natural gas hub, and building a natural gas pipeline from the Kenai Penninsula north to communities along the Parks Highway, which would have provided an incentive for further exploration and development of the Cook Inlet oil and gas fields. Given the dearth of resources and the failure by the Legislature and the Governors, and their opposition to ANGDA, to provide for bonding capacity, as has been done for the AGDC through Alaska Housing Finance Corporation and the Alaska Rail Road, ANGDA’s accomplishments were not insignificant. Under Harold Heinze and Scott Heyworth, ANGDA moved to meet its statutory mandate as was allowed by hostile administrations and an indifferent and, since the 2009, an increasingly hostile Legislature.

During his term, Governor Frank Murkowski had promised a natural gas pipeline and worked diligently on a 4.0 bcf/da pipeline proposal to make his promise reality. His efforts allegedly culminated in a contract with Exxon, Conoco and British Petroleum Alaska to build his pipe dream. The Palin campaign was able to successfully promote the all-Alaska natural gas pipeline in opposition to Murkowski’s efforts. It was revealed that what Murkowski called a contract was nothing more than an intent on the part of the oil companies to study the viability of building a 4.0 bcf natural gas pipeline to Alberta.

The size of any pipeline has also been an interesting side issue, and one often overlooked in any debate. The natural gas pipeline strategy effected under Murkowski, Palin and Parnell has been for a 4.0 bcf/day natural gas pipeline from the North Slope to Alberta. The theory being that there must be sufficient volume to replace declining revenues produced by the North Slope’s declining oil production. The all-Alaska natural gas pipeline proposed in 2002 was to be a 2.5 bcf with Bill Walker expanding that to 3.0 bcf under his campaign proposal. The AANGPV would terminate at an LNG train to convert the methane to Liquid Natural Gas (LNG).

Bill Walker’s AANGPV proposal would have provided for use of the gas liquids in-state to grow Alaska’s private sector, whereas Palin/Parnell’s AGIA, both the Canadian route and the LNG proposal under consideration to Valdez, and Murkowski’s proposal intended that the gas and gas liquids be shipped out of state for consumption and use elsewhere with little benefit to Alaskans beyond the in-state pipeline and LNG train construction and a direct infusion of cash at the State level.

The Alaska Oil Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC) has set a limit on the amount of natural gas that is available for sale in order to maintain sufficient pressure on North Slope legacy fields to allow production of remaining oil reserves. AOGCC has set a limit of 2.5-3.0 bcf available per day to deliver to a pipeline. Over 8 bcf per day is now reinjected back into the oil fields on the North Slope in order to maintain pressurization of the fields to make oil production feasible. AOGCC has been pretty consistent in its requirement that at least 5 bcf of the 8 bcf of gas produced per day be reinjected. The priority is in maintaining the State’s oil revenues.

During her 2006 campaign, Sarah Palin supported the mandate imposed by Proposition 3 and the construction of the AANGPV. Upon taking her oath of office, then Governor Sarah Palin turned her back on her support for that mandate and project, and moved forward with her Alaska Gas Inducement Act, which, to date, has produced nothing. AGIA was almost a mirror of Murkowski’s proposed pipeline plan. Instead of relying upon the Producers (Exxon, BP and Conoco), AGIA granted an exclusive to the winner of the competition promoted by the Palin Administration. Unfortunately, there was only one competitor, and that was TransCanada. Her successor, Governor Sean Parnell has not been able to move the proverbial natural gas pipeline football forward one inch towards a commitment for construction, a timeline to do anything, or even claim a successful open season.

During the 2010 campaign for governor in the Republican Primary, Bill Walker championed the AANGPV in his bid for the Republican nomination for Governor. Walker added a new dimension to the pipeline conversation that has been ignored since Parnell’s victory in the Republican Primary. That new dimension was the idea of value added resource development in the use of some of the gas to provide cheaper energy for the agriculture, timber, and mineral industries. Walker’s proposal would have seen take offs to communities down the Richardson Highway and at Glennallen. There was discussion regarding another spur across the Denali Highway to Cantwell. Fairbanks would have benefitted from the pipeline as the pipeline would have gone through with the gas liquids stripped at Fairbanks. The propane and butane would have been used as alternative fuels, with the ethane, hexane and other components being used to provide the building blocks for a plastics and petrochemical industry, giving a benefit to Alaska’s economy well beyond just the construction of the AANGPV. Walker’s proposal was the only proposal for a natural gas pipeline that went beyond just exporting Alaska’s gas to a foreign or domestic market.

The ASAP proposal was previously known as Harry Noah’s pipeline under Sarah Palin/Sean Parnell. The economics were never viable, but $14 million in State funding was appropriated to Noah’s pipeline study group for what was then known as the Bullet Line. Rep. Mike Hawker and Rep. Mike Chennault brokered deals to create the Alaska Gas Development Corporation by creating a frankenmonster of an entity to end the public’s mandate represented by ANGDA, but doing what the Legislature never did for ANGDA: providing for the ability to bond to finance any gasline projects using the resources of the Alaska Rail Road and the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation.

The Republican Primary in 2010 saw three competing natural gas pipeline projects: former Rep. Ralph Samuels promoted the ‘Bullet Line’ (ASAP), Governor Sean Parnell promoted AGIA, and former Mayor of Valdez Bill Walker promoted the AANGPV.

For some reason, it was fine by the Republican legislative majority and voters to support the Bullet Line, even though it was to be 100% state financed, and limited to a maximum volume of 500 mmcf/da under AGIA, but having the State of Alaska buy into the AANGPV for a 20% interest in order to control the timeline for construction was ‘socialist’ and a subject of great controversy. The estimated cost of the Bullet Line was $4B-$7B at that time, and the estimated cost of the AANGPV was $20B-$24B. Since, the ‘Bullet Line’ cost estimates have grown to almost $8B, but the AGIA version of the AANGPV costs have increased from the 2010 AANGPV estimates to $45B-$65B according to the October 1, 2012 letter to Governor Sean Parnell from Exxon, BP and Conoco.

Note the disparity in cost increases between the two pipelines. Does it make sense that the estimated costs of the AANGPV should increase by three times over the cost factors of the ‘Bullet Line’/ASAP pipeline? Is this a case of TransCanada/Exxon, BP and Conoco inflating the AANGPV to reinforce their reluctance towards moving North Slope natural gas to market?

The upswing in shale gas production has eliminated the domestic U.S. natural gas. A projected 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves in continental U.S. shale deposits made the idea of shipping Alaska natural gas to a U.S. market moot. Now, Alaska natural gas will have to compete with domestically produced U.S. shale gas on the world market, given the export permits applied for to move shale gas as LNG to Asian markets.

One of the greatest errors on the part of the Parnell Administration was ignoring the needs of Japan after the 2011 earth quake. A delegation came to Alaska seeking an audience with our governor. They did not meet with him. Another delegation came last year in June and met with DNR Commissioner Dan Sullivan. After leaving Alaska, the delegation comprising four Japanese companies, including Mitsubishi, travelled to British Columbia and Louisiana where they invested almost $4 billion between Cheniere Energy’s Sabine Pass LNG export expansion project and in Shell’s LNG export facility at Kitimat, B.C.

Alaska has a long term (43 years) relationship with Japan with respect to LNG exports. Conoco’s LNG train at Nikiski has been producing LNG for export to Japan since before the completion of the TAPS.

It certainly appears that AGIA has cost Alaska in lost business opportunities.

The ASAP’s primary purpose is no longer just the idea of supplementing Cook Inlet/Kenai gas production until storage and new exploration and development activities eliminate the specter of natural gas shortages that saw the closure of the Agrium ammonium nitrate fertilizer plant in Nikiski several years ago with the loss of 65 jobs. The ASAP will provide natural gas for Conoco’s LNG train at Nikiski for export to Asia. Given that the ASAP will be constructed at State of Alaska expense and its operation subsidized by the State, that is a very good deal for Conoco. At lease some of Alaska’s natural gas will make it Asia’s LNG market.

Cook Inlet has approximately 19 trillion cubic feet of estimated reserves remaining to be discovered. Exploration and development has picked up over the last two years, with more drilling planned this year. Unfortunately, there needs to be an upgrade in transportation infrastructure and storage to get the natural gas from the producing field to sufficient storage to carry south central’s demand through increasingly colder winters. It is not a declining production that is the issue, it is the lack of a suitable intra-field pipeline system to get the gas to the storage facility. As a result, Alaska may see the first importation of natural gas from Russia later this Spring.

With the 2014 gubernatorial elections looming, Governor Sean Parnell is in much the same situation as former Governor Frank Murkowski was at the time of his reelection bid against Sarah Palin. Under Parnell, the AGIA 4.0 bcf pipeline option to Canada is dead. The only viable option is the AGIA LNG option similar in size and scope to the AANGPV, excepting for no spur to Palmer and no in-state use of the gas liquids. Given the conflicts of interest on the part of Exxon, BP, Conoco and TransCanada, LNG from Alaska is unwelcome in the Asian market, because of competing developments on the part of the aforementioned.

Given that his administration cannot state any firm date for the construction of a pipeline, could it be that Governor Sean Parnell is exploring the possibility of running against Senator Mark Begich with the intent of bailing from the Governor’s office before the house of cards that is AGIA falls in on itself?

Such could be inferred from the remarks made by Lt. Gov. Mead Treadwell today. Treadwell commented on the recent upheavals in the Alaska Republican Party and its ability to promote and support the campaign against Democrate Senator Mark Begich. Treadwell stated that it may not be him running against Begich, but possibly Governor Sean Parnell. Treadwell had previously announced his intent to explore a run against Senator Mark Begich on November 30, 2012. If so, Treadwell will certainly run for governor in Parnell’s stead.

Bill Walker may have another shot at the Governor’s mansion if Parnell runs for the U.S. Senate. Under Parnell, Treadwell has not been terribly prominent in the public eye.

It should be noted that Governor Sean Parnell has not opposed theAGDC/ASAP proposal of Rep. Mike Hawker and Rep. Mike Chennault as demonstrated by HB4, nor did he oppose the previous iteration of that project proposed by Harry Noah under then Governor Sarah Palin. This lack of opposition leaves him in a position of being able to claim some degree of success with respect to moving Alaska’s North Slope natural gas to market. Ignoring of course, the fact that the ASAP project is limited to 500mmcf under AGIA, meaning the cost of transport to market will have to be subsidized by the State for the life of the pipeline. The cost of constructing the pipeline would also be borne by the State of Alaska.

Bill Walker’s AANGPV was the best option to date, as his plan provided for instate use of the gas liquids and natural gas to provide for cheap energy for agriculture and industry, alternative fuels for the Bush, and a petrochemical industry for Alaska. TransCanada and Exxon will send the gas and the gas liquids to Asia, if they bother to build a pipeline at all. Further, the AANGPV provided for a 250 mmcf/da spur into the Enstar Hub at Palmer to help mitigate the anticipated storage shortfalls from Cook Inlet natural gas production. A spur from Paxon west to Cantwell was also anticipated providing for a spur feeding to Nenana and connecting to any ANGDA pipeline from Nikiski north to Cantwell.

Competing with any potential Alaska LNG exports, Exxon has several large scale natural gas development LNG projects in the Pacific (Australia, Indonesia, New Guinea), and also needs a market for its portion of Qatar gas with the loss of the U.S. domestic natural gas market to domestically produced shale gas.

TransCanada is part of the Foothills Pipeline Company, which is involved in the Kitimat LNG port project. TransCanada was recently awarded a contract by Shell for a 2.4bcf pipeline to Kitimat, B.C.

Conoco has its portion of Qatar natural gas to move to market, now in Asia, because of the loss of the domestic U.S. market to shale gas. Conoco also has two Australia LNG projects that will compete with Alaska LNG for the Asian market.

Given the conflicts of interest on the part of Exxon Mobil, Conoco Phillips and TransCanada, is it any wonder why there has been no forward movement on AGIA?

Given the conflicts of interest on the part of Exxon and TransCanada, Governor Parnell has to be either totally brain dead, or simply ignoring reality, given his insistence on pursuing AGIA in the face of competing projects on the part of the TransCanada, Exxon, Conoco and BP. There is no provision under AGIA to declare breach of contract based upon a conflict of interest.

Given the increasing availability of natural gas in the world market, it may be better for the State to pay $500 million to $1.5 billion in penalties get out of AGIA. The lost opportunities will cost the state several orders of magnitude of any penalty under AGIA.

What are the differences between the ASAP natural gas pipeline and the all-Alaska natural gas pipeline option to Valdez?

Cost of construction is borne by the State: ASAP–100%; AANGPV–20% State ownership interest

Capacity: ASAP–500 mmcf/da; AANGPV–2.5-3.0 bcf/da

Benefits: ASAP will increase south central consumer gas costs by up to 13%; AANGVP will reduce or maintain present consumer costs, provide for growth in the private sector, because of in-state use of gas liquids, benefit beyond Alaska for growth in Asian customer’s economies

Cost of construction: ASAP–$8B; AANGPV–up to $45B-$65B (oil companies’ estimate) with LNG train and harbor improvements

Route: ASAP–North Slope to Nikiski across several salmon streams, Denali National Park and Denali State Park, but will not go through Fairbanks with no spur for consumers down the Richardson Highway south to Valdez; AANGVP–TAPS corridor from Prudhoe to Valdez covering all communities along the route through Fairbanks, with a 250 mmcf/da spur from Glennallen to Palmer and passing through Fairbanks down the Richardson Highway with a potential spur across the Denali Highway, LNG route--Valdez to Asia

Permitting status: ASAP–no permits issued; AANGVP–existing permits from Yukon Pacific Corp.

Estimated completion: ASAP–2019; AANGVP–two-three years from funding

Cost of gas to delivery per million cubic feet: ASAP–$9-$11.25/mmcf for Anchorage consumers (p13 of ASAP Project Plan); AANGVP–<$10/mmcf from the North Slope to Japan, including TAPS, LNG conversion costs, and LNG tanker costs (p15 of Wood-Mac study)

Gas liquids: ASAP–stripped at North Slope and reinjected; AANGVP–stripped at Fairbanks for use in Alaska

Testimony on HB4 was heard before the Senate Finance Committee today. HB4 is expected to pass out of the committee.

For more information:

ASAP Project Plan, Dec. 20, 2011–Joint In-state Gas Caucus

http://housemajority.org/neuman/pdfs/27/Gas_Caucus_New_Scenario_20121220.pdf

Wood MacKenzie Alaskan LNG Exports Competitiveness Study

http://www.arcticgas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/11-07-alaska-lng-competitiveness-study.pdf

Exxon Mobil LNG:

http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/energy_production_lng.aspx

Conoco Phillips LNG:

http://lnglicensing.conocophillips.com/EN/lngprojects/Pages/index.aspx

British Petroleum LNG:

http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9015376&contentId=7028020

http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9015513&contentId=7043288

TransCanada:

http://www.transcanada.com/coastal-gaslink.html

Other related articles:

http://www.examiner.com/article/agia-transcanada-s-conflict-of-interest

http://www.examiner.com/article/agia-exxon-s-conflict-of-interest

http://www.examiner.com/article/senator-lisa-murkowski-is-selling-lng-to-japan-when-parnell-will-not

http://www.examiner.com/article/support-for-the-all-alaska-natural-gas-pipeline-appears-local-campaigns

http://www.examiner.com/article/the-legislature-and-the-governor-neither-of-whom-can-make-a-decision

 
http://www.examiner.com/article/denali-is-dead-now-what

Monday, July 5, 2010

Leadership and Ralph Samuels

There has been much made about the lack of leadership shown by the current governor. Governor Sean Parnell has been described as lackluster, mediocre, behind the scenes and hard working, and a nice guy. Ralph Samuels has chosen “Leadership Now!” as his campaign slogan to emphasize his perception of the lack of leadership shown by Parnell. This is an interesting ploy on the part of Samuels, but akin to the pot calling the kettle black. Samuels has his own baggage as regards demonstrated leadership ability.
Samuels’ claim to fame, as touted by his avid radio entertainment advocates, was his solitary vote against former Gov. Sarah Palin’s Alaska Gas Inducement Act, or AGIA. Ralph Samuels was the only legislator to vote against AGIA.
On the surface, this is a bold statement as to his principles. However, it is an indictment against any claims of leadership ability. You see, Ralph Samuels was the House Majority Leader at the time.
Leadership is the ability to induce others to do what the leader wants them to do, whether or not they want to do the task at hand. In the case of Samuels as Marjority Leader, his job was to guide in direction, course, action, opinion, to influence his fellow Republicans in the majority caucus to act united in supporting or defeating whatever legislation was at hand. Where AGIA was concerned, Ralph failed miserably to exercise his leadership position.
Sarah Palin was hardly the pinnacle of cooperation and encouragement for the Legislature. Former Gov. Sarah Palin was a magnet for criticism. AGIA was not quietly passed, but argued vehemently at times. Where were those who argued against AGIA during the legislation’s travails through the legislative process? Why did they fail to stand with Ralph?
Samuels’ standing alone was not a case of a subordinate stubbornly refusing to follow the superior’s orders in good conscience. There was little or no risk in his opposition. Sarah Palin could hardly fire him. This was a case of a ranking member of the Legislative Branch standing against the Governor’s pet project. A governor who was not exactly engaged in any process at any time. A governor too busy with soap opera theatrics to demonstrate any leadership whatsoever during her tenure as governor. Therefore, Samuels’ singular opposition was hardly a case of political courage.
Nor, was Samuels act that of the commander of the Forlorn Hope given the impossible task for which survival of any so ordered unlikely. There was no personal danger involved. No threat to livelihood. No risk whatsoever. How was his sole vote an act of . . . leadership?
I will concede the issue of principle. To Samuels’ credit, he did stand his ground. To what end? If he was so in opposition, why was he standing alone? Why could he allegedly see what others were blind to?
House Majority Leader Ralph Samuels failed to influence his caucus to rally against Gov. Sarah Palin’s AGIA. Not one of his majority caucus minions followed his lead. Not one.
Yet, to hear Dan Fagan and Rick Rydell on their respective talk shows, Ralph’s vote against AGIA is the equivalent of Patrick Henry’s hanging, or Washington crossing the Delaware. Only one politician in Alaska’s political history deserves any real accolades, and that is former Governor Walter J. Hickel who challenged the federal government’s usurpation of sovereignty. He managed to get AS 38.05.500-505 passed. Yet, Samuels could not get one other to vote against AGIA.
To be cynical, was Samuels’ act an act of calculated political strategy? Did Samuels see in a distracted Gov. Sarah Palin the opportunity to challenge what was increasingly perceived as a weak and ineffectual governor?
It is interesting that her Lt. Governor has managed to accrue the same lack of respect. And, Samuels’ challenge.
Ralph Samuels campaign slogan of “Leadership Now” is either a demand by him for someone to step up, or a claim that he is the missing link for leadership. In either case, he is not the panacea that others claim. He is a failed leader.
Ralph Samuels held a powerful legislative position with a clear majority. Yet, he was not able to impede or to hinder the passage of AGIA.
In this time in Alaska’s history, given the decades to get major projects underway, the steady decline in oil production that constitutes 90% of the State’s revenues, and the fiscal catastrophe that will befall this State once TAPS declines to 300,000 bpd to market and is shut down, can we afford a governor who is a failed leader?

Thursday, September 24, 2009

What part of will of the people do not our elected officials understand ?

The election of 2002 saw the creation by the will of the people of an entity that is unique among the State’s agencies, boards and authorities. Something since ignored by former Governor Frank Murkowski, former Governor Sarah Palin, and now Governor Sean Parnell and the members of those legislators holding office from 2002 to the present. That something was the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority (ANGDA).

Let me remind you what we created. I have excerpted the relevant parts that remind us just exactly what we created this authority to accomplish and why it was created. Note the references to the looming Cook Inlet crisis.

You can find the following at http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/01gsln.htm

Petition ID: 01GSLN: The All-Alaskan Gasline Initiative:An Act establishing the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority, to maximize revenues for Alaska and jobs and gas for Alaskans.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:“. . . FINDINGS AND INTENT.
(a) The people find that
1. The Phillips-Marathon liquefaction facility at Nikiski has been supplying Cook Inlet natural gas to Japan and Southcentral Alaska at great profit and without interruption since 1969;
Cook Inlet gas supplies are dwindling rapidly with shortfalls anticipated as early as the winter of 2003;
2. Alaska's North Slope contains vast proven reserves of natural gas that have been known for at least 25 years but have never been developed;
3. these gas resources have never been offered for sale, because there has been no way to transport them to market;
4. multiple markets in North America and Asia have recently expressed an interest in receiving a proposal from Alaska for the purchase of Alaska gas;
5. if developed, these natural gas resources could represent substantial economic benefits to Alaskans in jobs, state revenue, and gas for Alaska citizens and businesses;
the major North slope leaseholders have competing gas reserves in other parts of the world vying for the same markets, creating a conflict of interest for them in advancing the sales of Alaska gas;
6. the North slope Producers agreed in 1991 to strand North Slope gas until at least 2005;
given the producer's conflicts of interest and their historic refusal to make North Slope natural gas available it may be necessary to take the gas back;
the permits necessary for an Alaskan gasline project have been pledged to the Alaska Natural 7. Gas Development Authority, operating as a port authority, to facilitate the development of the project;
8. there is sufficient gas for an all-Alaskan gasline project;
9. the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority offers substantial tax benefits that improve the economics of a gasline project;
10. state ownership of the pipeline and associated facilities has the potential to provide substantial revenues to the state and the Alaska Permanent Fund; and
11. Alaska's constitution requires that Alaska's resources are developed, utilized, and conserved for the maximum benefit of Alaska's people.
12. an all-Alaskan gasline maximizes jobs for Alaskans, revenues for the Alaskan treasury, and access to gas for Alaskans.
(b) It is the intent of this Act to create the All-Alaskan Natural Gas Development Authority for the purpose of developing, constructing, managing, and operating a gas pipeline from the North Slope of Alaska and a spur line to the Southcentral Alaska natural gas distribution grid
.”

What was the anticipated completion date of ANGDA’s project?

1. The goal of the authority is to have the Alaskan gas line in full production by 2007.

Had ANGDA’s mission been executed upon, Alaska and Alaskans would be enjoying revenues from 2 bcf per day of gas exported to Asia at $10 mmbtus, with the jobs, infrastructure and industry from the pipeline, LNG trains, Valdez port improvements and the gas liquids to further enhance and buffer Alaska’s economy from the stupidity in Washington, D.C. Instead, we face rolling blackouts this winter, and a slowing economy.

Remember this disrespect shown our will by our elected officials in Juneau.

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

SARAH PALIN, SEAN PARNELL, AND FRANK MURKOWSKI:
WHAT PART OF THE FOLLOWING WERE YOU UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND? WHY HAS THIS PIPELINE NOT BEEN BUILT!!!!!


INITIATIVE PETITION BILL LANGUAGE
by Petition Sponsors
Petition ID: 01GSLN
The All-Alaskan Gasline Initiative:An Act establishing the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority,to maximize revenues for Alaska and jobs and gas for AlaskansPosted 9/20/01

BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:* Section 1. The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to read:FINDINGS AND INTENT. (a) The people find that
1. The Phillips-Marathon liquefaction facility at Nikiski has been supplying Cook Inlet natural gas to Japan and Southcentral Alaska at great profit and without interruption since 1969;
2. Cook Inlet gas supplies are dwindling rapidly with shortfalls anticipated as early as the winter of 2003;
3. Alaska's North Slope contains vast proven reserves of natural gas that have been known for at least 25 years but have never been developed;
4. these gas resources have never been offered for sale, because there has been no way to transport them to market;
5. multiple markets in North America and Asia have recently expressed an interest in receiving a proposal from Alaska for the purchase of Alaska gas;
6. if developed, these natural gas resources could represent substantial economic benefits to Alaskans in jobs, state revenue, and gas for Alaska citizens and businesses;
7. the major North slope leaseholders have competing gas reserves in other parts of the world vying for the same markets, creating a conflict of interest for them in advancing the sales of Alaska gas;
8. the North slope Producers agreed in 1991 to strand North Slope gas until at least 2005;
9. given the producer's conflicts of interest and their historic refusal to make North Slope natural gas available it may be necessary to take the gas back;
10. the permits necessary for an Alaskan gasline project have been pledged to the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority, operating as a port authority, to facilitate the development of the project;
11. there is sufficient gas for an all-Alaskan gasline project;
12. the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority offers substantial tax benefits that improve the economics of a gasline project;
13. state ownership of the pipeline and associated facilities has the potential to provide substantial revenues to the state and the Alaska Permanent Fund; and
14. Alaska's constitution requires that Alaska's resources are developed, utilized, and conserved for the maximum benefit of Alaska's people.
15. an all-Alaskan gasline maximizes jobs for Alaskans, revenues for the Alaskan treasury, and access to gas for Alaskans.

(b) It is the intent of this Act to create the All-Alaskan Natural Gas Development Authority for the purpose of developing, constructing, managing, and operating a gas pipeline from the North Slope of Alaska and a spur line to the Southcentral Alaska natural gas distribution grid.

*Sec. 2. AS 41 is amended by adding a new chapter to read:

Chapter 41. Alaskan Natural Gas Development Authority.Article 1. Establishment of the Authority.


Sec. 41.41.010. Establishment of the authority. (a) There is established the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority, the purpose of which is to provide one or more of the following services and functions in order to bring natural gas from the North Slope to market, including
1. the acquisition and conditioning of North Slope natural gas;
2. the design and construction of the pipeline system;
3. the operation and maintenance of the pipeline system;
4. the design, construction, operation, of other facilities necessary for delivering the gas to market and to Southcentral Alaska; and
5. the acquisition of natural gas market share sufficient to ensure the long-term feasibility of the pipeline system project.

(b) The authority is a public corporation and an instrumentality of the state within the Department of Revenue.

(c) The authority has a legal existence independent of and separate from the state.

(d) The acquisition of natural gas from the North Slope and its delivery to tidewater for shipment to market by the authority is an essential government function of the state.

(e) The authority may not be terminated as long as it has bonds, notes, or other obligations outstanding.

Sec. 41.41.020. Authority governing body.

(a) The authority shall be governed by a board of directors consisting of seven members from the general public appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the legislature.

(b) The board shall annually elect a chair, and may elect other officers, from among its members.

Sec. 41.41.030. Term of office.

(a) The members of the board shall be appointed for terms of three years, and they may be reappointed.

(b) The terms of the members shall be staggered.

Sec. 41.41.040. Removal and vacancies.

(a) The governor may remove a member of the board from office. A removal must be in writing and must state the reason for the removal. A member who is removed may not participate in board business and may not be counted for purposes of establishing a quorum after the member receives written notice of removal. A member who is removed is not entitled to honoraria, per diem, or travel expenses authorized under AS 41.41.060 for work performed after the member receives the written notice of removal.

(b) The governor shall promptly fill a vacancy on the board by appointment. An appointee to a vacancy shall hold office for the balance of the term for which the appointee's predecessor on the board was appointed.

(c) A vacancy on the board does not impair the authority of a quorum of the board to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of the board.

Sec. 41.41.050. Quorum and voting. Four members of the board constitute a quorum for the transaction of business and the exercise of the powers and duties of the board. Action may be taken only upon the affirmative vote of a majority of the full membership of the board.

Sec. 41.41.060. Compensation of board members;

per diem and travel expenses. Members of the board are entitled to per diem and travel expenses authorized for boards and commissions under AS 39.20.180.

Sec. 41.41.070. Authority staff.

(a) The board may employ and determine the salary of a chief executive officer.

(b) The chief executive officer may, with the approval of the board, select and employ additional staff as necessary.

(c) An employee of the authority, including the chief executive officer, may not be a member of the board. The chief executive officer and the other employees of the board are in the exempt service under AS 39.25.110.

(d) In addition to its employees, the authority may contract for and engage the services of bond counsel, consultants, experts, and financial advisors the corporation considers necessary for the purpose of developing information, furnishing advice, or conducting studies, investigations, hearings, or other proceedings.

Sec. 41.41.080. Legal counsel. The attorney general
1. is the legal counsel for the authority;
2. shall advise the authority in legal matters; and
3. shall represent the authority in legal actions.Sec. 41.41.090. Conflicts of interest.

(a) Members of the board and the chief executive officer of the authority are subject to the provisions of AS 39.50.

(b) If a member of the board or an employee of the authority acquires, owns, or controls an interest, direct of indirect, in an entity or project in which assets of the authority are invested, the member shall immediately disclose the interest to the board. The disclosure is a matter of public record and shall be included in the minutes of the first board meeting following the disclosure.

Sec. 41.41.100. Budget.

The revenue earned by operations of the authority must be identified as the source of the operating budget of the authority in the state's operating budget under AS 37.07 (Executive Budget Act).

Sec. 41.41.110. Audits.

The Legislative Budget and Audit Committee may provide for an annual post audit and annual operational and performance evaluations of the authority's operations and budget.

Sec. 41.41.120. Reports and publications.

(a) By September 30 of each year, the board shall publish a report of the authority for distribution to the governor and the public. The board shall notify the legislature that the report is available.

(b) The report must include financial statements audited by independent outside auditors and a statement of the amount of money received by the authority from its operations during the period covered.

Sec. 41.41.130. Tax exemption.

The security instruments issued by the authority, the transfer of the security instruments, and the income on the security instruments are exempt from all taxes and assessments in the state.

Sec. 41.41.140. Political activities.

The resources of the authority may not be used to finance or influence political activities.

Sec 41.41.150. Public access to information.

(a) Information in the possession of the authority is a public record, except that information that discloses the particulars of the business or affairs of a private enterprise or investor is confidential and is not a public record for purposes of AS 40.25.110 - 40.25.140. Confidential information may be disclosed only for the purposes of an official law enforcement investigation or when its production is required in a court proceeding.

(b) The restrictions of (a) of this section do not prohibit the publication of statistics presented in a manner that prevents the identification of particular reports, items, persons, or enterprises.
Article 2. Powers of the Authority.

Sec. 41.41.200. Powers of the authority.

In furtherance of its corporate purposes, in addition to its other powers, the authority may
1. sue and be sued;
2. adopt a seal;
3. adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws and regulations;
4. make and execute contracts and other instruments;
5. in its own name acquire property, lease, rent, convey, or acquire real and personal property; a project site or part of a project site may be acquired by eminent domain;
6. acquire natural gas supplies;
7. issue bonds and otherwise incur indebtedness in accordance with AS 41.41.300 - 41.41.410 in order to pay the cost of a project;
8. accept gifts, grants, or loans from and enter into contracts or other transactions regarding gifts, grants, or loans with a federal agency or an agency or instrumentality of the state, a municipality, private organization, or other source;
9. enter into contracts or agreements with a federal agency, agency or instrumentality of the state, municipality, or public or private individual or entity, with respect to the exercise of its powers;
10. charge fees or other forms of remuneration for the use of authority properties and facilities;
11. defend and indemnify a current or former member of the board or an employee or agent of the authority against the costs, expenses, judgments, and liabilities as a result of actions taken in good faith on behalf of the authority; and
12. purchase insurance to protect its assets, services, and employees against liabilities that may arise from authority operations and activities.

Article 3. Revenue Bonds and Notes.

Sec. 41.41.300. Bonds and notes of the authority.

(a) The authority, by resolution, may issue revenue bonds and bond anticipation notes in order to provide funds to carry out the purposes set out in AS 41.41.010(a).

(b) The principal and interest on the revenue bonds or notes authorized and issued under (a) of this section are payable from authority funds. Bond anticipation notes may be payable from the proceeds of the sale of bonds or from the proceeds of the sale of other bond anticipation notes or, in the event bond or bond anticipation note proceeds are not available, the notes may be paid from other funds or assets of the authority.

(c) Bonds or notes may be additionally secured by a pledge of a grant or contribution from the federal government, or a corporation, association, institution, or person, or a pledge of money, income, or revenues of the authority from any source.

(d) Bonds or bond anticipation notes of the authority may be issued in one or more series and shall be dated, bear interest at the rate or rates per year or within the maximum rate, be in the denomination, be in the form, either coupon or registered, carry the conversion or registration provisions, have the rank or priority, be executed in the manner and form, be payable at the times, from the sources, and in the medium of payment and place or places within or outside the state, be subject to authentication by a trustee or fiscal agent, and be subject to the terms of redemption with or without premium, as the resolution of the authority may provide. Bond anticipation notes shall mature at the time or times that are determined by the authority. Bonds shall mature at a time not exceeding a number of years from their date that is determined by the authority. Before the preparation of definitive bonds or bond anticipation notes, the authority may issue interim receipts or temporary bonds or bond anticipation notes, with or without coupons, exchangeable for bonds or bond anticipation notes when these definitive bonds or bond anticipation notes have been executed and are available for delivery.

(e) Bonds or bond anticipation notes may be sold in the manner and on the terms the authority determines.

(f) If an officer whose signature or a facsimile of whose signature appears on a bond, note, or coupon attached to them ceases to be an officer before the delivery of the bond, note, or coupon, the signature or facsimile is valid to the same extent as if the officer had remained in office until delivery.

Sec. 41.41.310. Covenants.

In a resolution of the authority authorizing or relating to the issuance of bonds or bond anticipation notes, the authority has power by provisions in the resolution that will constitute covenants of the authority and contracts with the holders of the bonds or bond anticipation notes to

1. pledge to a payment or purpose all or a part of its revenues to which its right then exists or may thereafter come into existence, and the money derived from the revenues, and the proceeds of bonds or notes;
2. covenant as to the use and disposition of payments of principal or interest received by the authority on loans or other investments held by the authority;
3. covenant as to establishment of reserves or sinking funds and the making of provision for and the regulation and disposition of the reserves or sinking funds;
4. covenant with respect to or against limitations on a right to sell or otherwise dispose of property of any kind;
5. covenant as to bonds and notes to be issued, and their limitations, terms, and conditions, and as to the custody, application, and disposition of the proceeds of the bonds and notes;
6. covenant as to the issuance of additional bonds or notes, or as to limitations on the issuance of additional bonds or notes and the incurring of other debts;
7. covenant as to the payment of the principal of or interest on the bonds or notes, as to the sources and methods of the payment, as to the rank or priority of the bonds or notes with respect to a lien or security, or as to the acceleration of the maturity of the bonds or notes;
8. for the replacement of lost, stolen, destroyed, or mutilated bonds or notes;
9. covenant as to the redemption of bonds or notes and privileges of their exchange for other bonds or notes of the authority;
10. covenant to create or authorize the creation of special funds of money to be held in pledge or otherwise for operating expenses, payment or redemption of bonds or notes, reserves, or other purposes;
11. establish the procedure, if any, by which the terms of a contract or covenant with or for the benefit of the holders of bonds or notes may be amended or abrogated, the amount of bonds or notes the holders of which must consent to amendment or abrogation, and the manner in which the consent may be given;
12. covenant as to the custody of property or investments, their safekeeping and insurance, and the use and disposition of insurance money;
13. agree with a corporate trustee that may be a trust company or bank having the powers of a trust company within or outside the state as to the pledging or assigning of revenue or funds to which or in which the authority has rights or an interest; the agreement may further provide for other rights and remedies exercisable by the trustee as may be proper for the protection of the holders of a bond or note of the authority and not otherwise in violation of law and may provide for the restriction of the rights of an individual holder of bonds or notes of the authority;
14. appoint and provide for the duties and obligations of a paying agent or paying agents or other fiduciaries as the resolution may provide within or outside the state;
15. limit the rights of the holders of a bond or note to enforce a pledge or covenant securing the bonds or notes;
16. make covenants other than and in addition to the covenants expressly authorized in this section of like or different character, and to make covenants to do or refrain from doing acts and things as may be necessary or convenient and desirable in order to better secure bonds or notes or that, in the absolute discretion of the authority, will tend to make bonds or notes more marketable, notwithstanding that the covenants, acts, or things may not be enumerated in this section.

Sec. 41.41.320. Limitations of issuance of bonds.

(a) The authority may not issue bonds in an amount that exceeds the amount of bonds authorized to be issued by the legislature.

(b) This section does not apply to the issuance by the authority of refunding bonds or to the issuance by the authority of bonds the proceeds of which are intended to be used to refinance the loans held by the authority.

Sec. 41.41.330. Independent financial advisor.

In negotiating the private sale of bonds or bond anticipation notes to an underwriter, the authority may retain a financial advisor. A financial advisor retained under this section must be independent from the underwriter.

Sec. 41.41.340. Validity of pledge.

(a) The pledge of assets or revenue of the authority to the payment of the principal or interest on an obligation of the authority is valid and binding from the time the pledge is made, and the assets or revenue become immediately subject to the lien of the pledge without physical delivery or further act. The lien of a pledge is valid and binding against all parties having claims in tort, contract, or otherwise against the authority, irrespective of whether those parties have notice of the lien of the pledge.

(b) This section does not prohibit the authority from selling assets subject to a pledge, except that a sale may be restricted by the trust agreement or resolution providing for the issuance of the obligations.

Sec. 41.41.350. Capital reserve funds.

(a) For the purpose of securing one or more issues of its obligations, the authority may establish one or more special funds, called "capital reserve funds," and shall pay into those capital reserve funds

(1) money appropriated and made available by the state for the purpose of those funds,

(2) proceeds of the sale of its obligations, to the extent provided in the resolution or resolutions of the authority authorizing their issuance, and

(3) other money that may be made available to the authority for the purpose of those funds from another source. All money held in a capital reserve fund, except as provided in this section, shall, subject to appropriation, be used as required solely for the payment of the principal of obligations or of the sinking fund payments with respect to those obligations; the purchase or redemption of obligations; the payment of interest on obligations; or the payment of a redemption premium required to be paid when those obligations are redeemed before maturity. However, money in a fund may not be withdrawn from that fund at any time in an amount that would reduce the amount of that fund to less than the capital reserve requirement set out in (b) of this section, except for the purpose of making, with respect to those obligations, payment, when due, of principal, interest, redemption premiums, and the sinking fund payments for the payment of which other money of the authority is not available. Income or interest earned by, or increment to, a capital reserve fund due to the investment of the fund or other amounts in it may be transferred by the authority to other funds or accounts of the authority to the extent that the transfer does not reduce the amount of the capital reserve fund below the capital reserve fund requirement.

(b) If the authority decides to issue obligations secured by a capital reserve fund, the obligations may not be issued if the amount in the capital reserve fund is less than a percent, not exceeding 10 percent, of the principal amount of all of those obligations secured by that capital reserve fund then to be issued and then outstanding in accordance with their terms, as may be established by resolution of the authority, called the "capital reserve fund requirement," unless the authority, at the time of issuance of the obligations, deposits in the capital reserve fund from the proceeds of the obligations to be issued or from other sources an amount that, together with the amount then in the fund, will not be less than the capital reserve fund requirement.

(c) In computing the amount of a capital reserve fund for the purpose of this section, securities in which all or a portion of the funds are invested shall be valued at par or, if purchased at less than par, at amortized costs as the term is defined by resolution of the authority authorizing the issue of the obligations or by some other reasonable method established by the authority by resolution. Valuation on a particular date must include the amount of interest earned or accrued to that date.

(d) To assure the continued operation and solvency of the authority for the carrying out of its corporate purposes, provision is made in (a) of this section for the accumulation in capital reserve funds of an amount equal to their capital reserve fund requirement.

(e) The chair of the authority shall annually, not later than January 2, make and deliver to the governor and chairs of the house and senate finance committees a certificate stating the sum, if any, required to restore a capital reserve fund to the capital reserve fund requirement. The legislature may appropriate that sum, and all sums appropriated during the current fiscal year by the legislature for the restoration shall be deposited by the authority in the appropriate capital reserve fund.

(f) This section does not create a debt or liability of the state.

Sec. 41.41.360. Remedies.

A holder of obligations or coupons attached to them issued under the provisions of this chapter, and a trustee under a trust agreement or resolution authorizing the issuance of the obligations, except as restricted by a trust agreement or resolution, either at law or in equity, may enforce all rights granted hereunder or under the trust agreement or resolution, or under another contract executed by the authority under this chapter, and may enforce and compel the performance of all duties required by this chapter or by the trust agreement or resolution to be performed by the authority or by an officer of it.

Sec. 41.41.370. Negotiable instruments.

All obligations and interest coupons attached to them are negotiable instruments under the laws of this state, subject only to applicable provisions for registration.

Sec. 41.41.380. Obligations eligible for investment.

Obligations issued under the provisions of this chapter are securities in which all public officers and public bodies of the state and its political subdivisions, all insurance companies, trust companies, banking associations, investment companies, executors, administrators, trustees, and other fiduciaries may properly and legally invest funds, including capital in their control or belonging to them. These obligations may be deposited with a state or municipal officer of an agency or political subdivision of the state for a purpose for which the deposit of bonds, notes, or obligations of the state is authorized by law.

Sec. 41.41.390. Refunding bonds.

(a) The authority may provide for the issuance of refunding bonds for the purpose of refunding an obligation then outstanding that has been issued under the provisions of this chapter, including the payment of redemption premium on them and interest accrued or to accrue to the date of redemption of the obligations. The issuance of the bonds, the maturities and other details of them, the rights of the holders of them, and the rights, duties, and obligations of the authority in respect of them are governed by the provisions of this chapter that relate to the issuance of obligations insofar as those provisions may be appropriate.

(b) Refunding bonds may be sold or exchanged for outstanding bonds issued under this chapter, and, if sold, the proceeds may be applied, subject to appropriation and in addition to another authorized purpose, to the purchase, redemption, or payment of the outstanding obligations. Pending the application of the proceeds of refunding bonds, with any other available funds, to the payment of the principal, accrued interest, and redemption premium on the obligations being refunded, and, if so provided or permitted in the resolution authorizing the issuance of the refunding bonds or in the trust agreement securing them, to the payment of any interest on the refunding bonds and expenses in connection with the refunding, the proceeds may be invested in direct obligations of, or obligations the principal of and the interest on which are unconditionally guaranteed by, the United States that mature or that will be subject to redemption, at the option of the holders of them, not later than the respective dates when the proceeds, together with the interest accruing on them, will be required for the purposes intended.

Sec. 41.41.400. Credit of state not pledged.

(a) Obligations issued under the provisions of this chapter do not constitute a debt, liability, or obligation of the state or of a political subdivision of the state or a pledge of the faith and credit of the state or of a political subdivision of the state but are payable solely from the revenue or assets of the authority. Each obligation issued under this chapter must contain on its face a statement that the authority is not obligated to pay it or the interest on it except from the revenue or assets of the authority and that neither the faith and credit not the taxing power of the state or of a political subdivision of the state is pledged to the payment of the principal of or the interest on the obligation.

(b) Expenses incurred by the authority in carrying out the provisions of this chapter are payable from funds provided under this chapter, and liability may not be incurred by the authority in excess of these funds.

Sec. 41.41.410. Officers not liable.

A member or other officer of the authority is not subject to personal liability or accountability by reason of having executed or issued an obligation.

Article 4. Property of the Authority.

Sec. 41.41.450. Property of the authority.

The authority may acquire, by purchase, lease, or gift, upon terms that it considers proper, land, structures, real or personal property rights, rights-of-way, franchises, easements, and other interests in land it considers necessary or convenient for the financing of the project or a part of the project.


Article 5. Project Construction.

Sec. 41.41.500. Contract terms relating to use of Alaska resources.

(a) The authority shall enter into one or more prehire project term agreements with labor organizations that

(1) contain no-strike clauses; and

(2) secure timely completion of the project and maximum employment opportunities for state residents.

(b) To maximize the economic benefits of the project to Alaskan businesses, the authority shall use Alaska contractors and suppliers to the maximum extent possible to take advantage of the Alaska experience in Arctic engineering and construction.

Article 6. General Provisions.

Sec. 41.41.900. Tax exemption. All obligations issued under this chapter are declared to be issued by a body corporate and public of the state and for an essential public and governmental purpose, and the obligations, and the interest and income on and from the obligations, and all fees, charges, funds, revenues, income, and other money pledged or available to pay or secure the payment of the obligations, or interest on the obligations, are exempt from state taxation except for transfer, inheritance, and estate taxes.

Sec. 41.41.990. Definitions. In this chapter,
1. "authority" means the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority;
2. "board" means the board of directors of the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority;
3. "project" means the gas transmission pipeline, together with all related property and facilities, to extend from the Prudhoe Bay area on the North Slope of Alaska to tidewater at a point on Prince William Sound and the spur line from Glennallen to the Southcentral gas distribution grid, and includes planning, design, and construction of the pipeline and facilities as described in AS 41.41.010(a)(1) - (5).

*Sec. 3. AS 39.25.110(11) is amended by adding a new subparagraph to read:
(G) Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority;

*Sec. 4. AS 39.50.200(b) is amended by adding a new paragraph to read:
(57) the board of directors and chief executive officer of the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority (AS 41.41.020).

*Sec. 5. The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to read:
DEVELOPMENT OF PROJECT PLAN. Not later than one year after the first meeting of the board of directors of the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority, the board shall produce a development plan. The development plan must include
1. estimates of construction costs and timelines;
2. gas procurement prices;
3. use of the state's royalty gas;
4. estimates of revenue to the general fund and the Alaska permanent fund;
5. a revenue sharing plan with municipal governments;
6. a plan for delivery and pricing of natural gas to communities along the pipeline route and to Southcentral Alaska through a spur line;
7. a plan for delivery and pricing of LNG to Yukon River and coastal communities;
8. a payment schedule to companies providing permits or other valuable assets;
9. a marketing plan to approach potential buyers;
10. a plan to maximize Alaskan hire, including project labor agreements; and
11. a plan to ensure meeting the highest environmental and safety standards, including a citizens advisory council.
12. The goal of the authority is to have the Alaskan gas line in full production by 2007.

*Sec. 6. The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to read:
INITIAL APPOINTMENTS OF MEMBERS OF ALASKA NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY BOARD OF DIRECTORS. Of the members first appointed under AS 41.41.020(a), enacted by sec. 2 of this Act,
1. three members shall be appointed to three-year terms;
2. two members shall be appointed to two-year terms; and
3. two members shall be appointed to one-year terms.

Tuesday, September 1, 2009

Blackouts in South Central this winter!

It was very recently reported in the Frontiersman that Matanuska Electric Association is now warning of the high probability of rolling blackouts this winter.

With 35tcf of NG reserves, known and estimated, the most populous region in the State is now facing a third world power crisis in the dead of winter?

Why?

The primary issue is not so much a lack of natural gas in Cook Inlet, but the lack of infrastructure to deliver the gas in Cook Inlet to market and to store the excess for use during peak periods. Lacking is the storage infrastructure and the pipelines necessary to move the gas from the well to a storage facility. The storage facility may be above ground tanks or old gas wells. Lacking also are the needed storage facilities.

This lack of infrastructure is a travesty. This situation is the result of a serious lack of planning on the part of our leaders, and industry. However, industry cannot build the facilities needed without the permits to do so. The Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA) allegedly has been a major impediment to this process, not a facilitator.

Where was the leadership on the part of our government to prevent a crisis that has been building for many years, now?

For at least the last 10 years, this situation has been talked about, debated, pooh-poohed, and largely ignored. In the last gubernatorial election, it was a topic of concern, and a topic all admitted was serious, and if not addressed soon, would result in power interruptions at the very least.

Sarah gave lip service during the campaign, but did nothing to promote a solution. Knowles and Murkowski largely ignored the situation. Mark Begich and his predecessors complained of the looming situation, but did nothing other than the occasional public pronouncement..

The harbinger of this situation? The shutdown of Agrium’s ammonium nitrate plant at Nikkiski, resulting in the loss of over 60 jobs and the money they brought to businesses in the area.

Recently, the Regulatory Commission of Alaska held a public session in which the power utilities were castigated for not having any plans for such a contingency. Yet, this august body was the primary focus of a complaint by Marathon Oil regarding a lack of exploration and production permits during the last 10 years, having a great bearing on the short fall in available natural gas that will very likely result in your lights going out this winter.

The choice will be your lights or heat. Heat wins every time.

We voted to create the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority to insure we had gas for use in Alaska and to get our North Slope gas to market. Yet, since its creation, ANGDA has been hindered, impeded, and stifled in effecting its voter created mandate. Both Sarah Palin and Frank Murkowski restricted ANGDA’s funding to the detriment of our natural gas development priorities.

An aloof Legislature has not aided in providing some modicum of a solution in the absence of the governors’ indifference, either through legislation making it easier for the oil companies to construct the needed infrastructure.

I just spent 5 months in Canada on an oil field services related project in British Columbia and Alberta. You can bet that what is going to happen this winter in Alaska cannot happen there. Socialist governments, with B.C. being the most restrictive, somehow manage comprehensive oil and gas development. Pipeline construction is ongoing.

Yet, south central Alaska is now facing the specter of rolling blackouts. Our North Slope natural gas still remains stranded. The Canadians rapidly move forward with a LNG port at Kittimat, B.C. to export natural gas to Asia. Meanwhile Alaska’s Rep. Jay Ramras says the coming Open Season will be a bust—meaning no forward progress on any pipeline proposal.

Alaska’s leadership has a terminal case of “can’t”.

There needs to be a serious shift in paradigms on the part of our Legislature, DNR and the Governor’s office regarding support for new oil and gas development here. Failing same, we need to replace one and all in the coming elections.

Keep sending the same tired faces back to do nothing, results in nothing being accomplished, except to spend money we no longer have.

Maybe, a few blackouts this winter will result in some needed change in Juneau?

Saturday, August 15, 2009

Palin’s appointment is going to haunt Parnell

Last year, Sarah Palin appointed a pipeline czar. Harry Noah, who was Executive Director of Mental Health Trust Lands, was appointed by Sarah to the newly created position of natural gas pipeline czar. The position was charged with overseeing the development of natural gas pipelines and moving Alaska’s gas to market. Harry is a miner without oil and gas experience, but is someone who has ties to Dep. Commissioner Marty Rutherford, Dept. of Natural Resources (DNR).

Rutherford was a former lobbyist for TransCanada. She has worked for the State in one capacity or another from the Knowles Administration through the Palin Administration, and now is one of Parnell’s upper echelon DNR staff. This individual, like Noah, has no oil and gas experience, but has been continually put in positions to influence oil and gas decisions.

The problem for Parnell is, that Noah’s post duplicates the voter created Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority’s (ANGDA) portfolio. ANGDA was created with the approval of Proposition 3 by 62% of Alaskans voting in the 2002 election.

What was ANGDA’s mandate?

To develop and market Alaska’s natural gas resources both in-state and for export, including the building of a natural gas pipeline to Valdez.
Then Gov. Frank Murkowski, who had campaigned on his own pipe dream, did not support ANGDA. Gov. Murkowski tried to give ANGDA the cold shoulder. He initially refused to fund ANGDA. Murkowski was finally forced to give the voter created authority an office and a meager budget to begin the job of getting Alaska’s gas to market. Murkowski then proceeded to continue to ignore ANGDA for the rest of his tenure as governor.
ANGDA remained in the shadow of the Murkowski pipeline to nowhere dream for the rest of the Murkowski Administration.

Sarah Palin, running against Murkowski in 2006, supported both an all-Alaska pipeline route down TAPS to Valdez and ANGDA as the vehicle to get our gas to market and to build the pipeline. During the gubernatorial campaign, Sarah criticized Murkowski’s pipe dream. ANGDA was mentioned prominently in many of her speeches on natural gas issues.

The looming Cook Inlet natural gas shortage was also a topic spoken of by our former Governor as an example of ignoring the obvious.

Once in office, Sarah Palin did a Frank Murkowski with her AGIA plan, which became the third such plan to build a large capacity (>4bcf/day) pipeline through Canada. This plan, like those of her predecessors, served to increase Canadian job opportunity, both in Alaska and Canada.

Earlier this year, Sarah appointed Harry Noah as her pipeline czar. Shortly thereafter, ANGDA’s funding was cut by the Palin Administration.

Since, the ongoing row between ANGDA and Noah has become more obstructionist on Noah’s part.

In creating the pipeline czar position, Gov. Sarah Palin did exactly what she campaigned against: duplication of mission, and an unnecessary growth of government.

As reported in the Copper Center Record in April of 2009, ANGDA has evolved into a highly respected professional organization with innovative ideas to get Alaska’s gas to market and to make use of the abundant propane that is part of our natural gas deposits for home and business heating in the Bush.

The core of ANGDA’s strategy has been to engage the private sector’s participation in its plans. The propane initiative has a commitment for propane production from the North Slope producers. Private companies will transport, distribute and sell the propane. ANGDA is conducting seminars so that electric utilities will be able to bid intelligently on natural gas supplies during the upcoming open season.

ANGDA has completed both the rights of way and economic studies for the Glenn-Richardson highway route for a 24 inch natural gas line to Palmer’s Enstar Hub. This route will take off from either the AGIA pipe at Big Delta or from an all-Alaska pipe to Valdez at Glennallen.
The economics of gas delivery are tied to volume. Taking off of either proposed big pipeline projects gives south central Alaska gas customers the best pricing for delivery. The cost of our gas will be included in the transport of the larger volume, thereby reducing the cost of any gas delivered to south central.

Pipeline Czar Harry Noah wants a 24 inch pipeline from the North Slope down the Parks Highway to Anchorage. The low volume of approximately 500 million cubic feet per day in comparison to the rates for transporting 2.5 bcf per day through an all-Alaska pipeline to Valdez will result in south central gas customers paying double or more on their gas rates to provide Fairbanks with essentially, the cheapest gas in the State. This is because Fairbanks gas would have the least cost for transport. Those of us in south central and on the Kenai would pay more because of the distance transported.

ANGDA’s position is that if the Open Seasons in 2010 for the Alaska-Canada pipe projects (AGIA and Denali) are a bust, then an in-State "bullet line" from the North Slope through Fairbanks down into south central Alaska should be considered. Until then, it makes the most economic sense to bring a spur line down the Richardson and Glenn highways off of any of the proposed large diameter pipeline projects to the gas hub at Palmer.

Presently, projects under consideration are Conoco-Phillips Denali project and AGIA (TransCanada and Exxon).

TransCanada and Exxon have recently expressed interest in an all-Alaska pipeline to Valdez and LNG terminal option, given the Canadian LNG terminal project at Kittimat, B.C. (This is what the Alaska voters created ANGDA to do in 2002.)

ANGDA has already completed much of the work in evaluating the Parks route. ANGDA’s work with that of the U.S DOE in 2005, private oil industry in the mid- 1990's, and the 1988 Federal Environmental Impact Study completed by the former Yukon Pacific Company (YPC) all concluded that while the Parks Highway route and the Richardson/Glenn are about equal in cost of construction, the Parks route has permitting and engineering hurdles yet to be addressed.

The Parks Highway route would require rights of way through State and federal parks and wildlife refuges, including major salmon tributaries. This route would be a lawsuit magnet by the environmental anti-development groups. Further, the route presents major engineering challenges along the route near Cantwell, Denali, and at Hurricane Gulch that have yet to be addressed.

The only route that will get natural gas to south central in a timely manner is the ANGDA route down the Richardson/Glenn Highway corridors. This route has none of the Federal or State environmental or engineering impediments. This route uses the existing TAPS oil corridor to Glennallen. The last 150 miles from Glennallen to Palmer is the only segment not in the TAPS right of way. In 2005, ANGDA acquired the State of Alaska Conditional Right of Way for last 150 miles to Palmer from Glennallen . Therefore, the route proposed by ANGDA has none of the impediments of the Parks Highway route. Both routes use the TAPS corridor right of way north of Fairbanks.

The ANGDA preferred route will provide the cheapest gas to Alaskans.

Pipeline Czar Harry Noah now intends to duplicate the work on the Parks Route with additional studies at additional State expense. Baker Engineering is contracted to repeat much of what has already been accomplished by ANGDA, the feds and YPC.

Playing against all of this is the looming shortfall in Cook Inlet natural gas supplies. The specter of rolling brown outs and blackouts during peak winter months are being publically discussed for the first time. The lack of sufficient supplies of Cook Inlet natural gas to fuel both homes and Chugach’s gas turbines at Beluga Point was openly and harshly discussed at a recent Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA) meeting reported by the Petroleum News. The power utilities were criticized for not having any contingency plans for such an eventuality.

Yet, the reality is, this is a looming situation known for years. It is the result of the politics of oil in Alaska, and a lack of concern by Alaska’s Legislature and governors, including Sarah Palin.

As previously reported, Marthon Oil complained to the Anchorage Chamber of Commerce earlier this year about declining gas supplies and the intransigence of the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA) in issuing new drilling permits for exploration, making it difficult for the oil company to plan and allocate drilling resources. Just 7 new wells were drilled in Cook Inlet last year.

Over 10,000 new wells were drilled in Alberta alone last year. That volume of new wells is considered a bad year for oil and gas in Alberta. Down from 13,000 the year before and 18,000 the year before that.

ANGDA was created by the voters in 2002 to do what Harry Noah was charged with under the Palin Administration. Gov. Sean Parnell is continuing that mistake.
Sarah Palin’s Harry Noah may be the albatross impeding the Parnell Administration’s attempt to get Alaska back on the oil and gas development map.

The voters knew what they wanted in creating ANGDA. We wanted an all-Alaska natural gas pipeline. However, three governors and the Legislatures of those years all failed us.

The Canadians are moving swiftly to tie up Asian gas markets for their LNG facility under construction at Kittimat, B.C.

Funny, the Canadians can export natural gas to Asia cheaply, but Alaska cannot.

Why?

Both Sarah Palin and Frank Murkowski attempted to thwart the will of the people by impeding ANGDA’s mission.

The specter of rolling brownouts and blackouts in the middle of winter in Alaska’s most populated region is real.

Parnell needs to eliminate the position of pipeline czar, and let ANGDA do its job. If he continues to allow Noah to create conflicts with ANGDA and to further delay the opportunity to put Alaska’s North Slope gas to best use, Parnell may very well have to answer to the people in 2010.

Saturday, May 16, 2009

AGIA is Dead--published in the Alaska Journal of Commerce

your OP-ED is everywhere worldwide now Larry.........no thanks needed.
these type replies keep coming in to me!

ya did good old man.
it's one hell of a factual, well thought out piece.
and you are right!
LNG export from Valdez is our only hope.
and with a spur off it at Glennallen.....bringing the cheapest tariff posssible to South-Central consumers
plus NGL's for in-State new value-added industries!

not some mini Enstar Parks Highway line!!
rape.

best,
S


Subject: Re: Opinion: Lower 48 develops huge gas reserves, rendering AGIA dead

Hey S..........once I finished reading this article, my first and only thought was a thoughtfully phrased "Well, no shit.....".
Best regards, Steve.
Sent: Friday, May 15, 2009 3:19 PM

Subject: Opinion: Lower 48 develops huge gas reserves, rendering AGIA dead

S
From the North,South,East and West, comes the messageSarah is out to lunch on instategas. She can't help but read the letters to the editor.
The e-mails
The phone calls
The pet. news articles
Larry Woods
I don't know whats wrong with her.
This instate gas with ANGDA isgetting up a head of steam
Logic and truth will prevail.
There's a reckoning coming up.I can't wait
Bill
-------------
As published in the Alaska Journal of Commerce 15 May, 2009:

Opinion: Lower 48 develops huge gas reserves, rendering AGIA dead
By Larry Wood

Alaska Journal of Commerce

Alaska has just been relegated to the back burner where any natural gas pipeline to the Lower 48 is concerned.
The Palin administration and its predecessors bet the bank on a 4 billion to 4.5 billion cubic foot per day pipeline that will never be built. AGIA (the Alaska Gasline Inducement Act) is now a dead end.
What happened? Some 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in shale deposits is now being developed in northern Louisiana.
Known as the Haynesville shale deposit, this deposit has been known for many years. Some estimates put the potential reserves at 1,600 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. This formation is not unique.
The Barnett shale in Texas and many other such formations that run throughout the continental U.S. may hold as much as 2.2 quadrillion (2,200 trillion) cubic feet of natural gas. This is enough natural gas to fuel the U.S. demand for at least 100 years. Much longer if the upper-end estimates for the Haynesville shale prove to be anywhere close.
As with any of man's endeavors, technology keeps improving and what was impossible a few years ago is now possible. This is the situation with the shale formations. The drilling companies previously lacked the technology to exploit these deposits.
With the potential of these shale formations now in hand, the U.S. is awash in natural gas. The potential for this gas coming into production is very real; something that did not play into the planning of the big-diameter pipelines our governors seem to favor. The technology and strategies used today were not in place when former Gov. Tony Knowles first proposed his Alaska Highway route into the Lower 48.
AGIA is now relegated to the dustbin of history by virtue of the magnitude of the shale formation potential physically located within the U.S. market.
The Palin administration must see this and move forward to develop the only market available to it: the world, more particularly Asia, and preferably Japan and Taiwan.
The maximum amount of natural gas that can be moved off the North Slope and allow oil production to continue is about 2 billion cubic feet per day. This is because 2.5 billion cubic feet per day is required to keep the oil fields pressurized to maintain production.
Alaska must now focus on getting the 2 billion cubic feet of natural gas available to market.
What Gov. Sarah Palin must realize is that she had it right during the 2006 race. An all-Alaska pipeline of 1.5 billion cubic feet to 2 billion cubic feet capacity must be built from the North Slope to Valdez using the existing Trans-Alaska Pipeline System rights of way.
I understand that the permits are already largely in place to build the project.
Within five years, this pipeline could be moving gas to markets in Asia and elsewhere.
Keeping the all-Alaska natural gas pipeline at a level of 1.5 billion cubic feet of gas per day would give the required 500 million cubic feet of natural gas for a bullet line from Glennallen to Enstar's hub in Palmer. Fairbanks would receive natural gas from the main pipeline running down the TAPS right of way - just as was proposed during the 2006 campaign.
How does the state finance the project?
The precedent is already there in the manner in which the Alaska Railroad is run.
The Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority is in place and ready to move forward.
Use the permanent fund to provide collateral for necessary bonding.
Selling the natural gas in the world market would allow us to get the highest price. The Russians have shown that they are unreliable; therefore, there is opportunity. The customer could benefit from a consistent and dependable supply.
Providing for a regulatory environment that would encourage oil and gas exploration would ensure that Alaska would have adequate in-state development of these resources and an ever-expanding ability to use these resources to the maximum benefit of Alaskans.
It is going to take a leader to make such a shift in paradigm.
The choice is yours, governor. You can either rewrite the paradigm or your administration can continue to flounder and continue to make no headway. Or you can decide to change the paradigm, and move this state to a place that those of us who backed you thought we were headed, until AGIA.
Larry Wood is the general manager of Terra Resources Ltd., an environmental cleanup and remediation company based in Palmer. He is currently working in Canada on an oil services-related project.

Friday, May 1, 2009

AGIA IS DEAD!




Alaska has just been relegated to the back burner where any natural gas pipeline to the lower 48 is concerned. The Palin Administration and its predecessors bet the bank on a 4-4.5 billion cubic foot per day pipeline that will never be built. AGIA is now a dead end.


What happened?


200 TRILLION cubic feet of natural gas in shale deposits now being developed in northern Louisiana. Known as the Haynesville Shale deposit, this deposit has been known for many years. Some estimates put the potential reserves at 1,600 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. This formation is not unique.
The Barnett Shale in Texas and many other such formations that run throughout the continental U.S. may hold as much as 2,200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. This is enough natural gas to fuel the U.S. demand for at least 100 years. Much longer if the upper end estimates for the Haynesville Shale prove to be anywhere close.

As with any of man’s endeavors, technology keeps improving and what was impossible a few years ago is now possible. This is the situation with the shale formations. The drilling companies previously lacked the technology to exploit these deposits.

With the potential of these shale formation now in hand, the U.S. now is awash in natural gas.

The potential for this gas coming into production is very real. Something that did not play into the planning of the big diameter pipelines our governors seem to favor. The technology and strategies used today were not in place when Tony Knowles first proposed his Alaska Highway route into the lower 48 states.

AGIA is now relegated to the dustbin of history by virtue of the magnitude of the shale formation potential physically located within the U.S. market. The Palin Administration must see this and move forward to develop the only market available to it: the world, more particularly, Asia, and, preferably, Japan and Taiwan.

The maximum amount of natural gas that can be moved off the North Slope and allow oil production to continue is about 2 billion cubic feet per day. This is because 2.5 billion cubic feet per day is required to keep the oil fields pressurized to maintain production.
Alaska must now focus on getting the 2 billion cubic feet of natural gas to market.
What Governor Palin must realize is that she had it right during the 2006 race. An all-Alaska pipeline of 1.5 billion cubic feet to 2 billion cubic feet capacity must be built from the North Slope to Valdez using the existing TAPS rights of way.

I understand that the permits are already largely in place to build the project.

Within 5 years this pipeline could be moving gas to markets in Asia and elsewhere.

Keeping the all-Alaska natural gas pipeline at a level of 1.5 billion cubic feet of gas per day would give the required 500 million cubic feet of natural gas for a bullet line from Glennallen to Enstar’s hub at Palmer. Fairbanks would receive natural gas from the main pipeline running down the TAPS right of way. Just as was proposed during the 2006 campaign.

How does the State finance the project?

The precedent is already there in the manner in which the Alaska Railroad is run.

The Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority is in place and ready to move forward.

Use the Permanent Fund to provide collateral for necessary bonding.

Selling the natural gas in the world market would allow us to get the highest price. The Russians have shown that they are unreliable, therefore, there is opportunity. The customer could benefit from a consistent and dependable supply.
Providing for a regulatory environment that would encourage oil and gas exploration would ensure that Alaska would have adequate in-state development of these resources and an ever expanding ability to use these resources to the maximum benefit of Alaskans.

It is going to take a leader to make such a shift in paradigm.

The choice is yours, Governor. You can either rewrite the paradigm, or your administration can continue to flounder and continue to make no headway. Or, you can decide to change the paradigm, and move this state to a place that those of us who backed you thought we were headed, until AGIA.

Thursday, January 22, 2009

Doing it right' means Alaska will get the most out of its gas

(Background on the Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline situation. Written just prior to the 2006 election. Relevant to any Alaska Gas Pipeline discussion, the arguments against an LNG port at Valdez, Alaska to ship North Slope natural gas to the U.S. were answered here. )

The gas line route favored by Gov. Frank Murkowski and inherited from former Gov. Tony Knowles - "My Way is the Highway" - parallels the trans-Alaska oil pipeline right of way to Big Delta, and then goes east into Canada.

Murkowski's route differs from the original Knowles route in that it extends the pipeline through Canada into the United States near Chicago. This is the longest and most expensive route of any proposed thus far, some 3,500 miles with an estimated cost of $25 billion. This cost estimate has increased by $5 billion since Congress passed loan guarantees in 2004 totaling $18 billion.

Murkowski is seeking a $4 billion investment ownership by the state of Alaska. If built, the Murkowski-Knowles pipeline is to be a 48-, 52- or 54-inch pipeline with a capacity of 4.5 billion cubic feet per day and expandable to 6 bcf per day. Estimated completion date is 2016, if the producers decide the line is viable after another long five-year study.

Problems with the Murkowski-Knowles pipeline routes include: Rising cost estimates; North Slope natural gas reserves are insufficient to cover the financing cost over 30 years; steel for rolling the pipe requires a full year's world steel production quota; and new, and, as yet, untried pipe technology is also required.

The only viable alternative to the governor's Canadian pipeline is a liquefied natural gas project advocated so passionately over the years by Jeff Lowenfels. It is the same route originally permitted by Yukon Pacific Corp. The permits to build the Yukon Pacific natural gas pipeline have been in place since the mid-1980s.

In other words, if the producers would sell North Slope natural gas, construction on this line could begin almost immediately. This pipeline route parallels the existing trans-Alaska oil pipeline from Prudhoe to Valdez. Obviously, all jobs and construction generated by this route stay in Alaska.

Most importantly, this route would generate a spur line into the Matanuska Valley along the Glenn Highway or possibly down the Parks Highway. Alaskans recognized the logic and benefits of this route when we passed Proposition 3 in the 2002 election, which created the Alaska Natural Gas Development Authority.

The Yukon Pacific pipeline was designed to carry 2.2 bcf per day to a LNG plant to be constructed in Valdez. The liquefied gas was to be transported to other markets by LNG tankers. The economics for this pipeline was predicated on natural gas with a market price at or above $3 per million British thermal units (a million Btu equals approximately 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas). The current market price is still above $8 per million Btu and has recently been as high as $15 per million Btu.

ANGDA carefully assessed the original Yukon Pacific LNG project and found it both economical and feasible. ANGDA has included a spur line of 500,000 cubic feet per day into Southcentral Alaska via Palmer as part of its pipeline plans. The ANGDA pipeline could be moving gas within five years after the start of construction, including the necessary LNG plant at Valdez. The cost is estimated at $14 billion.

The Alaska Gas Port Authority is a consortium of Fairbanks, the North Slope Borough and Valdez to promote and build a natural gas pipeline using the Yukon Pacific route, but with a difference. The capacity of the pipeline that the port authority is advocating is now up to 4.5 bcf per day to match the Murkowski-Knowles pipeline. However, this increase in capacity also changes the dynamics of the original route permitting. This means that the port authority will have to acquire some new permits, and repermit others, meaning additional delays before construction would begin. The port authority also advocates and promises to build a spur line to Palmer.

Potentially, with the ANGDA or port authority pipeline proposals, Alaska gas could be flowing to market by 2012.

As noted by Pedro van Meurs in the Fairbanks Daily News Miner Jan. 30, in comparing Alaska's hydrocarbon resource development policy with that of Norway: "With the present system, wealth is slipping through the fingers of Alaskans and Norwegians hold on to it ... Norwegians are doing something right, and Alaskans are doing something wrong." Van Meurs is the Murkowski administration's chief consultant in the gas line negotiations with the major North Slope producers.

Why not an Alaska petrochemical industry stripping our gas of natural gas liquids - butane, ethane and propane - for use in Alaska to provide new industry and creating new jobs, before our natural gas leaves the state? Why do we have to keep doing it wrong and let the real wealth of using our resources to build industry in Alaska continue to slip through our fingers?
Alaskans need the opportunity, jobs and the industry our natural gas represents, not more government.